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韩恺特黯然离场,他为何没能改善福特的财务状况?

韩恺特黯然离场,他为何没能改善福特的财务状况?

Shawn Tully 2020年08月07日
福特CEO失败的原因是其未能完成结构臃肿的汽车制造商最需要做的事情。

韩恺特试图通过大胆树立范本,制造无人驾驶和电动汽车,来改变一个老牌行业风向标的形象。事实证明,韩恺特失败的原因是其未能完成结构臃肿的汽车制造商最需要做的事情,即进行基本的重组,从精简、高效的工厂和设计中心基地获得更多的利润。

8月4日,在度过刚满三年的不稳定的任期后,福特汽车公司宣布其首席执行官韩恺特将离任。加入福特之前,韩恺特经营着一个家具制造企业Steelcase,此次福特公司将要任命的首席执行官不同于韩恺特的背景,是福特的首席运营官吉姆•法利,他已在福特工作了13年,由于出色的营销业绩获得晋升。

2017年5月,福特董事会将韩恺特提升为首席执行官,负责将这家拥有114年历史的汽车制造商“现代化”。为了完成这一任务,韩恺特努力通过部署机器人来控制制造成本,并在产品组合中使用通用部件。他计划通过重点引入3D打印和虚拟现实等技术,简化过时的设计和开发流程。总的来说,韩恺特开始多线作战。他的目标是修复而不是抛弃失败的海外业务,特别是在欧洲的业务。他的第二个任务是推进三个有前景的新领域——电动汽车、动力型面包车等共享汽车和自动驾驶汽车。韩恺特还承诺加强盈利业务,用以弥补国外损失,并进行新的投资(例如福特漫游者(Ranger)等皮卡,以及SUV系列——加上所有带大写“E”字母的汽车,探险者(Explorer)、翼虎(Escape)、征服者(Expedition)、锐界(Edge)和翼博(EcoSport))。

韩恺特做出了许多明智之举,其中,从价格低廉的嘉年华(Fiesta)到豪华林肯轿车(Lincoln),韩恺特几乎摒弃了所有亏损的乘用车生产线,更别提失去光彩的金牛座(Taurus)了,金牛座曾经是美国最畅销的品牌。定于2020年年底上市的全电动Mustang Mach-E可能会掀起一波新的热潮,最终可能成为特斯拉Model Y的强劲对手。

但总体而言,韩恺特的大胆愿景未能实现复兴老式汽车企业所必需达成的目标:从新产品和主要产品上获得持续上升的投资回报。实现这一目标的方法是什么?那就是,降低生产成本的同时,降低开创性产品设计以及工厂设备更新的前期支出。

一项关键指标显示,在韩恺特的领导下,福特的数据越来越差。这一指标就是由一流会计专家杰克·西西尔斯基提出的资产的现金经营回报率(或简称为COROA)。COROA用于衡量所有工厂、库存和其他投资于业务的资产所产生的现金。这些资产的总额为分母,虽然COROA采用经营现金流量作为分子,但是其通过添加两者的现金回款来消除杠杆和税收的影响,从而获得“经营现金流”。你可以看到,COROA是一个纯粹的衡量标准,衡量管理层对股东委托给他们的所有资金的管理情况。

2016年,在韩恺特接手福特的前一年,福特资产负债表上平均总资产为2,660亿美元(包括累计折旧)。表中记录了198.5亿美元的投资营运现金流,回报率为9.2%。以大制造标准来看,这个数字似乎达到中等水平。虽然与汽车零部件制造商博格华纳(Borg Warner)相比,福特落后了一大截,但其几乎与丹纳赫集团(Danaher)(9.2%)相匹敌,并险胜通用汽车(GM)(8.6%)。

但在2017至2019年的三年中,尽管福特的资产负债表膨胀了,但所有额外投资产生的现金却变少了。在此期间,福特的平均资产总额从2,660亿美元上升至2,900亿美元,即9%的增长率,而经营现金流却下降了22亿美元,至176.4亿美元。换句话说,在260亿美元的新增资产中,有8.5%的负收益。因此,福特的COROA从2016年的9.2%下降到2019年的8.2%。

不过福特仍然得以击败通用汽车,通用汽车的表现甚至更为糟糕。但福特远远落后于丹纳赫(9.8%)和博格华纳(11.3%)。有趣的是,2016年,特斯拉因COROA为负值-4%而落后。但自那以后,特斯拉一路高歌猛进:到2019年,特斯拉的COROA已经跃升了近9个百分点,远超福特的8.2%。

长期以来,福特的资本回报率不足,而且从其股价可以看出这些回报正在下降。2019年收盘时,其股价为9.30美元,与1987年的水平持平。在疫情危机中,福特的股价下跌至6.84美元,使得福特的市值缩水四分之一,至272亿美元。

即使在这个水平,购买福特的股票也不划算。根本原因在于:福特陷入了竞争激烈的低利润业务。它还面临政府和工会的压力,迫使汽车制造商维持过时的工厂运行,以维持就业岗位,它还受到有关排放、安全和燃料效率三个层面的法规限制。此外,竞争对手不断推出热门的新车型,赶超或击败它们需要数十亿美元的投资,而这些投资需要数年时间才能得到回报。

福特实现盈利的最佳选择范围越来越小。如果它专注于两个领域,即利润丰厚的SUV和皮卡品牌,以及未来有望实现大规模增长的电动汽车,它或许可以实现这一目标。但是选择这条路将迫使福特舍弃打造一个辉煌的未来,以匹配其传奇的过往——相反地,它要无奈地接受制造稳定、可靠的车辆,从而让福特一路走下去。(188金宝搏 下载)

译者:Biz

韩恺特试图通过大胆树立范本,制造无人驾驶和电动汽车,来改变一个老牌行业风向标的形象。事实证明,韩恺特失败的原因是其未能完成结构臃肿的汽车制造商最需要做的事情,即进行基本的重组,从精简、高效的工厂和设计中心基地获得更多的利润。

8月4日,在度过刚满三年的不稳定的任期后,福特汽车公司宣布其首席执行官韩恺特将离任。加入福特之前,韩恺特经营着一个家具制造企业Steelcase,此次福特公司将要任命的首席执行官不同于韩恺特的背景,是福特的首席运营官吉姆•法利,他已在福特工作了13年,由于出色的营销业绩获得晋升。

2017年5月,福特董事会将韩恺特提升为首席执行官,负责将这家拥有114年历史的汽车制造商“现代化”。为了完成这一任务,韩恺特努力通过部署机器人来控制制造成本,并在产品组合中使用通用部件。他计划通过重点引入3D打印和虚拟现实等技术,简化过时的设计和开发流程。总的来说,韩恺特开始多线作战。他的目标是修复而不是抛弃失败的海外业务,特别是在欧洲的业务。他的第二个任务是推进三个有前景的新领域——电动汽车、动力型面包车等共享汽车和自动驾驶汽车。韩恺特还承诺加强盈利业务,用以弥补国外损失,并进行新的投资(例如福特漫游者(Ranger)等皮卡,以及SUV系列——加上所有带大写“E”字母的汽车,探险者(Explorer)、翼虎(Escape)、征服者(Expedition)、锐界(Edge)和翼博(EcoSport))。

韩恺特做出了许多明智之举,其中,从价格低廉的嘉年华(Fiesta)到豪华林肯轿车(Lincoln),韩恺特几乎摒弃了所有亏损的乘用车生产线,更别提失去光彩的金牛座(Taurus)了,金牛座曾经是美国最畅销的品牌。定于2020年年底上市的全电动Mustang Mach-E可能会掀起一波新的热潮,最终可能成为特斯拉Model Y的强劲对手。

但总体而言,韩恺特的大胆愿景未能实现复兴老式汽车企业所必需达成的目标:从新产品和主要产品上获得持续上升的投资回报。实现这一目标的方法是什么?那就是,降低生产成本的同时,降低开创性产品设计以及工厂设备更新的前期支出。

一项关键指标显示,在韩恺特的领导下,福特的数据越来越差。这一指标就是由一流会计专家杰克·西西尔斯基提出的资产的现金经营回报率(或简称为COROA)。COROA用于衡量所有工厂、库存和其他投资于业务的资产所产生的现金。这些资产的总额为分母,虽然COROA采用经营现金流量作为分子,但是其通过添加两者的现金回款来消除杠杆和税收的影响,从而获得“经营现金流”。你可以看到,COROA是一个纯粹的衡量标准,衡量管理层对股东委托给他们的所有资金的管理情况。

2016年,在韩恺特接手福特的前一年,福特资产负债表上平均总资产为2,660亿美元(包括累计折旧)。表中记录了198.5亿美元的投资营运现金流,回报率为9.2%。以大制造标准来看,这个数字似乎达到中等水平。虽然与汽车零部件制造商博格华纳(Borg Warner)相比,福特落后了一大截,但其几乎与丹纳赫集团(Danaher)(9.2%)相匹敌,并险胜通用汽车(GM)(8.6%)。

但在2017至2019年的三年中,尽管福特的资产负债表膨胀了,但所有额外投资产生的现金却变少了。在此期间,福特的平均资产总额从2,660亿美元上升至2,900亿美元,即9%的增长率,而经营现金流却下降了22亿美元,至176.4亿美元。换句话说,在260亿美元的新增资产中,有8.5%的负收益。因此,福特的COROA从2016年的9.2%下降到2019年的8.2%。

不过福特仍然得以击败通用汽车,通用汽车的表现甚至更为糟糕。但福特远远落后于丹纳赫(9.8%)和博格华纳(11.3%)。有趣的是,2016年,特斯拉因COROA为负值-4%而落后。但自那以后,特斯拉一路高歌猛进:到2019年,特斯拉的COROA已经跃升了近9个百分点,远超福特的8.2%。

长期以来,福特的资本回报率不足,而且从其股价可以看出这些回报正在下降。2019年收盘时,其股价为9.30美元,与1987年的水平持平。在疫情危机中,福特的股价下跌至6.84美元,使得福特的市值缩水四分之一,至272亿美元。

即使在这个水平,购买福特的股票也不划算。根本原因在于:福特陷入了竞争激烈的低利润业务。它还面临政府和工会的压力,迫使汽车制造商维持过时的工厂运行,以维持就业岗位,它还受到有关排放、安全和燃料效率三个层面的法规限制。此外,竞争对手不断推出热门的新车型,赶超或击败它们需要数十亿美元的投资,而这些投资需要数年时间才能得到回报。

福特实现盈利的最佳选择范围越来越小。如果它专注于两个领域,即利润丰厚的SUV和皮卡品牌,以及未来有望实现大规模增长的电动汽车,它或许可以实现这一目标。但是选择这条路将迫使福特舍弃打造一个辉煌的未来,以匹配其传奇的过往——相反地,它要无奈地接受制造稳定、可靠的车辆,从而让福特一路走下去。(188金宝搏 下载)

译者:Biz

Jim Hackett tried to transform an old-line industrial icon by forging a daring template to go driverless and electric. As it turned out, what doomed Hackett was his failure to perform what a bloated automaker needs most, a basic restructuring to squeeze far more dollars in profit from a shrunken, highly-efficient base of plants and design centers.

On August 4, the Ford Motor Co. announced that CEO Hackett will step down after a rocky tenure of just over three years. Unlike Hackett, who ran furniture-manufacturer Steelcase before joining the automaker, Ford is naming one of its own, COO and 13-year veteran Jim Farley, who rose in sales and marketing.

In May of 2017, the Ford board promoted Hackett to CEO with a charge to "modernize" the 114 year old carmaker. In pursuit of that mission, Hackett strove to curb manufacturing costs by deploying robots, and use common parts across the portfolio. His blueprint for streamlining outmoded design and development processes centered on introducing such techniques as 3D printing and virtual reality. Overall, Hackett followed a multi-front campaign. He aimed to fix, not ditch, failing overseas operations, notably in Europe. A second quest was advancing three promising new fields, electric vehicles, mobility including dynamic vans, and self-driving cars. Hackett also pledged to strengthen the profitable lines that are paying for the foreign losses and fresh investments (think trucks including Ford Ranger, and SUV series––plus all the Big "E's," Explorer, Escape, Expedition, Edge and EcoSport).

Hackett made a number of smart moves, among them shedding almost all of its money-losing passenger car line from the budget Fiesta to the luxury Lincoln sedan, not to mention the fading Taurus, once America's best selling brand. The all-electric Mustang Mach-E, due for launch in late 2020, is a potential hit that could prove a strong challenger to Tesla Model Y.

But overall, Hackett's bold vision failed to deliver what's essential to reviving an old-fashioned metal-bending enterprise: Consistently rising returns on investment from fresh and staple products. The way to get there? Through a combination of hammering down production costs, and lowering the up-front outlays for designing pioneering products and retooling plants.

A key metric shows that Ford's numbers got worse under Hackett's leadership. The yardstick is Cash Operating Return on Assets, or COROA, developed by leading accounting expert Jack Ciesielski. COROA measures the cash generated from all the factories, inventories and other assets invested in the business. Those total assets are the denominator. For the numerator, COROA uses cash from operations, but eliminates the effects of leverage and taxes by adding back cash payments for both to get "Operating Cash Flows." What you see from COROA is a pure measure of management's stewardship of all the dollars entrusted to them by shareholders.

For 2016, the year before Hackett took charge, Ford had an average of $266 billion in total assets on its balance sheet (including accumulated depreciation). It recorded $19.85 billion in cash from operations from those investments for a return of 9.2%. By Big Manfacturing standards, that number seemed middling. It trailed auto parts-maker Borg Warner by a wide margin, but almost matched conglomerate Danaher (9.2%) and edged out GM (8.6%).

But over the three years spanning 2017 to 2019, while Ford swelled its balance sheet, it produced less cash from all the extra investment. Over that period, its total average assets rose from $266 to $290 billion, or 9%, while its operating cash flow fell by $2.2 billion, to $17.64 billion. In other words, it posted a negative return of 8.5% on the $26 billion in added assets. As a result, its COROA dropped from 9.2% in 2016, to 8.2% in 2019.

Ford still managed to beat GM, whose performance deteriorated even more. But it stands well behind Danaher (9.8%) and Borg Warner (11.3%). Interestingly, Tesla was a laggard in 2016 at a negative COROA of .4%. But since then Tesla roared ahead: by 2019, Tesla's COROA had jumped almost 9 points, pulling a bumper ahead of Ford at 8.2%.

That Ford has long been generating inadequate returns on capital, and that those returns are falling, is reflected in its stock price. At the close of 2019, its shares stood at $9.30, their level in 1987. In the pandemic crisis, Ford's shares have sunk bo $6.84, dropping its market cap by one-fourth to just $27.2 billion.

Even at these levels, though, Ford is not a buy. The reason is fundamental: It's stuck in a ferociously competitive, low-margin business. It also faces governments and unions that pressure automakers to keep outdated factories running to preserve jobs, and impose three levels of regulations governing emissions, safety and fuel efficiency. Plus, competitors are constantly launching hot new models, and matching or beating them requires multibillion investments that take years to pay off.

Ford's best option for getting profitable is getting smaller. It can get there if it focuses in two areas, its highly lucrative SUV and truck brands, and electric cars that promise big growth in the years ahead. That course would force Ford to forget about building a glorious future to match its storied past—and instead settle for building a steady, reliable vehicle that can stay on the road.

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